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Pursuing Environmental Justice: Obstacles and 
Opportunities—Lessons from the Field† 
Helen H. Kang  
INTRODUCTION 
When I was invited to participate in the Access to Equal Justice: 
Critical Perspectives on Court and Law Reform Colloquium, our 
panel was slated to discuss Pursuing Environmental Justice: 
Obstacles and Opportunities. Before our panel convened, Professor 
Jane Spinak delivered the keynote address for the colloquium. I 
attended Professor Spinak‘s speech mostly out of collegial respect; I 
did not think that family law had anything to contribute to 
environmental justice. But as I listened to the talk, I was struck by 
how pertinent some of the questions Professor Spinak raised about 
family court reform are to environmental justice.  
Professor Spinak‘s talk challenged me to consider some 
fundamental questions about my own work in environmental justice. 
Why do our clients at the Environmental Law and Justice Clinic (―the 
clinic‖) end up in court at all? What do these clients and the nature of 
their cases have to say about environmental law? What do the 
answers to these questions suggest about law reform? These 
questions are important to the environmental justice movement. Just 
as epidemiologists study clinical cases to learn about the etiology of 
 
 
† I take inspiration from the title of Luke W. Cole‘s Correspondence, Remedies for 
Environmental Racism: A View from the Field, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1991 (1992).  
 
 Director, Environmental Law and Justice Clinic, and Associate Professor, Golden 
Gate University School of Law. B.A. (1982), Yale University; J.D. (1986), Boalt Hall, 
University of California at Berkeley. Environmental Law and Justice Clinic was established in 
1994 to provide legal representation and advocacy to environmental groups and communities 
fighting disproportionate environmental health hazards, with a special focus on communities of 
color and low-income neighborhoods. Thanks to Cliff Rechtschaffen, Karen Pierce, and 
Bradley Angel for their valuable comments on this Article and to my clinic clients and 
colleagues from whom I take ideas and draw inspiration.  
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disease, law practitioners can study judicial cases to learn about the 
environment and the state of environmental regulation. 
In response to these questions, I argue that the clinic‘s clients and 
similarly situated grassroots groups pursue litigation because the laws 
do not adequately protect them from pollution at the neighborhood 
level. Environmental lawsuits filed by such groups result from the 
conclusion that there is ―too much‖ pollution in the neighborhood—
there is elevated background pollution, violations of environmental 
laws contribute to excess pollution, and litigation is one of the few 
ways to redress the distributive injustice resulting from pollution 
created by multiple sources.  
Addressing neighborhood-level pollution through legislation and 
regulation should be a priority for communities and governments at 
all levels because environmental justice is a larger societal concern. 
Even beyond the potential health impacts pollution can cause, it 
worsens vulnerabilities that already exist in poor and minority 
neighborhoods. Without change, even communities that are 
organized and resourceful enough to pursue litigation will be able to 
seek only case-by-case redress in the courts. They will not be able to 
effect the system-wide reform that is needed to address cumulative 
pollution and pollution hot spots. Courts will remain the only fora in 
which these communities can seek procedural and corrective—if not 
distributive and social—justice.1 
Reforms to address neighborhood pollution are possible, but only 
if governments and citizens make a serious commitment. There are 
many reform possibilities, including moving quickly to implement 
specific regulatory programs to instill confidence in the government‘s 
resolve to address such pollution, identifying vulnerable 
communities, and providing for procedural and substantive 
protections specific to high-impact areas. This Article focuses on air 
pollution because of the well-documented impacts of air quality 
disparities and environmental justice groups‘ efforts to address them 
through litigation. 
 
 1. See Robert Kuehn, A Taxonomy of Environmental Justice, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10681 
(2000) (explaining the different conceptions of justice relevant to environmental justice: 
distributive, procedural, corrective, and social justice). 
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I. WHAT IS AN ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE COMMUNITY? 
In Dreams from My Father, President Obama describes Altgeld, 
one of the communities in Chicago in which he worked as a 
community organizer. Altgeld painfully resembles the neighborhoods 
our clinic attempts to protect:  
The Altgeld Gardens public housing project sat at Chicago‘s 
southernmost edge . . . .  
To the east, on the other side of the expressway, was the Lake 
Calumet landfill, the largest in the Midwest.  
 And to the north, directly across the street, was the 
Metropolitan Sanitary District‘s sewage treatment plant. . . .  
 The stench, the toxins, the empty uninhabited landscape. 
For close to a century, the few square miles surrounding 
Altgeld had taken in the offal of scores of factories, the price 
people had paid for their high-wage jobs. Now that the jobs 
were gone, and those people that could had already left, it 
seemed only natural to use the land as a dump. 
 A dump—and a place to house poor blacks.  
 Still, everything about the Gardens seemed in a perpetual 
state of disrepair. Ceilings crumbled. Pipes burst. Toilets 
backed up. . . . So that most children in Altgeld grew up 
without ever having seen a garden. Children who could see 
only that things were used up, and that there was a certain 
pleasure in speeding up the decay.
2
 
At the clinic, we define environmental justice (―EJ‖) communities 
as low-income communities and communities with a majority 
population who are people of color. While we couple this 
demographic description with another modifier that is typically used 
to describe EJ communities—populations that bear disproportionate 
pollution burdens and enjoy fewer environmental amenities—this 
 
 2. BARACK OBAMA, DREAMS FROM MY FATHER: A STORY OF RACE AND INHERITANCE 
164–66 (2004 ed.).  
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second modifier tends to be redundant. When cases come to us from 
low-income or people-of-color communities, disproportionate 
environmental benefits and burdens are always present. Pollution 
mapping and academic studies suggest that our experience is not 
unique.  
Indeed, EJ communities are too easily found in many places.
3
 
Perhaps the definition that EJ communities and their advocates use is 
similar to Justice Potter Stewart‘s test for obscenity: ―I know it when 
I see it.‖4 In the San Francisco Bay Area alone, several communities 
are low-income, with majority people of color; these communities are 
burdened disproportionately by pollution and enjoy fewer 
environmental amenities: West Oakland; the Hunters Point Bayview 
community in San Francisco; Richmond; East Palo Alto; parts of San 
Jose and Redwood City; and communities in transition, such as 
Antioch and Pittsburg in Contra Costa County, which are home to 
many families displaced by economic development in the central part 
of the San Francisco Bay Area.
5
 These Bay Area communities, in 
addition to being viscerally recognizable as EJ communities, are 
well-documented pollution hot spots. Pollution maps using 
 
 3. For descriptions of many EJ communities and the issues they face, see Charles Lee, 
Warren County’s Legacy for the Quest to Eliminate Health Disparities, 1 GOLDEN GATE U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 53, 59–60 (2007). See also Miller v. City of Dallas, No. Civ.A. 3:98-CV-2955-D, 
2002 WL 230834, at *1, *7 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (describing the EJ community of Cadillac 
Heights, Texas); Emily L. Dawson, Lessons Learned from Flint, Michigan: Managing Multiple 
Source Pollution in Urban Communities, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y REV. 367, 379–
82 (2001) (describing the EJ community of Flint, Michigan). 
 4. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Potter, J., concurring). 
 5. The Bay Area Environmental Health Collaborative‘s website hosts pollution maps 
with information on racial demographics and accumulation of pollution sources. See Bay Area 
Environmental Health Collaborative, Cumulative Impact Maps and Powerpoints, 
http://www.baehc.org/poped.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2009); see also MANUEL PASTOR, JAMES 
SAAD & RACHEL MORELLO-FROSCH, CTR. FOR JUSTICE, TOLERANCE, & CMTY., UNIV. OF 
CAL., SANTA CRUZ, STILL TOXIC AFTER ALL THESE YEARS: AIR QUALITY AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA 6 (2007), http://www2.ucsc.edu/ 
cjtc/docs/bay_final.pdf [hereinafter PASTOR ET AL., STILL TOXIC] (utilizing such a map). The 
STILL TOXIC report exemplifies community-based research in which academics conduct 
research that communities request. This report was prepared by the University of California, 
Santa Cruz‘s Center for Justice, Tolerance & Community, for the Bay Area Environmental 
Health Collaborative, a community advocacy group comprised of several coalitions and about 
twenty environmental advocacy groups and grassroots organizations. The Environmental Law 
and Justice Clinic is part of this collaborative. 
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Geographic Information System show that race and pollution 
correlate uncomfortably well in those areas.
6
  
II. WHY DOES THE PURSUIT OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE  
REMAIN IMPORTANT? 
Since President Clinton issued his executive order on 
environmental justice fifteen years ago,
7
 government agencies have 
developed environmental justice policies.
8
 Many agencies have also 
 
 6. The Geographic Information Systems (―GIS‖) maps that show the relationship 
between race and pollution are accessible online. See Bay Area Environmental Health 
Collaborative Maps, http://www.baehc.org (follow hyperlinks to various GIS maps) (last visited 
Dec. 2, 2009). GIS mapping allows pictorial representations of data for particular locations and 
often is used as a social justice tool. See GIS/Mapping, Kirwan Inst. for the Study of Race and 
Ethnicity, The Ohio State Univ., http://kirwaninstitute.org/research/gismapping/ (last visited 
Dec. 2, 2009) (―[R]esearchers recognize that inequality has a geographic footprint, and have 
pioneered the use of maps to communicate the history and presence of discriminatory and 
exclusionary policies that spatially segregate people.‖). For another example of GIS mapping, 
see TOTAL AIRBORNE LEAD EMISSIONS BY UNITED STATES COUNTY, NATURAL RES. DEF. 
COUNCIL, http://www.nrdc.org/health/effects/lead/lead_emitters_county_map.pdf. At the 
Association of American Law Schools‘ May 2009 Annual Conference, I saw a foreclosure map 
of Cleveland, Ohio, most likely generated using GIS. I thought that it would be useful to 
overlay that map against pollution mapping to see how well they match up.  
 One of the limitations of GIS mapping is that it is very resource intensive to create GIS 
maps and make them user-friendly. Our clinic‘s experience is that producing GIS maps requires 
substantial time, first to acquire and understand the underlying data, and then to refine and 
reduce obvious errors in the data. GIS mapping also requires collaboration among different 
experts, including a graphic artist. 
 7. Executive Order 12898 states that to the ―extent practicable and permitted by law . . . 
each Federal agency shall make achieving environmental justice part of its mission by 
identifying and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human health or 
environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and low-
income populations in the United States.‖ Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 
1994). Bradley Angel of Greenaction for Health & Environmental Justice points out that the 
EPA and other government agencies systematically violate their own Environmental Justice 
policies, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Executive Order. E-mail from 
Bradley Angel, Executive Director of Greenaction, to Helen Kang (Sept. 9, 2009) (on file with 
author). 
 8. For a survey of federal agency responses, see Denis Binder et al., A Survey of Federal 
Agency Response to President Clinton’s Executive Order 12898 on Environmental Justice, 31 
ENVTL. L. REP. 11133 (2001). States have also enacted legislation directed at promoting 
environmental justice. See, e.g., Antonette Benita Cordero & Carol J. Monahan, Environmental 
Justice Grows Up, ENVTL. L. NEWS, Fall 2003, at 15 (discussing California‘s environmental 
justice legislation). The South Coast Air Quality Management District was among the first 
government agencies to formally adopt guiding principles and initiatives to ensure 
environmental justice. See S. COAST AIR QUALITY MGMT. DIST., ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
INITIATIVES (1997), http://www.aqmd.gov/ej/ej_original10.htm; S. COAST AIR QUALITY 
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provided funding opportunities for grassroots groups that work on 
environmental issues.
9
 Some agencies have sponsored seminal 
studies of pollution hot spots as a result of consistent and organized 
demands from communities and growing health research on 
disproportionate exposure to pollution and cumulative risk.
10
  
But government agencies have not pursued these environmental 
justice goals with a sustained effort. Thus, to date, environmental 
justice considerations have failed to affect environmental decision 
making.
11
 Similarly, and perhaps consequentially,
 
there does not 
appear to be evidence that environmental justice considerations have 
changed the behavior of polluters in any significant way.  
Meanwhile, evidence of environmental injustice has become more 
compelling. This evidence shows that minority and low-income 
communities continue to suffer disproportionate environmental 
impacts, while enjoying fewer benefits.
12
 Studies also demonstrate 
 
MGMT. DIST., GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMIC JUSTICE (1997), http://www.aqmd.gov/ej/ 
EJ_guiding_principles.htm.  
 9. For a description of the Environmental Protection Agency‘s (―EPA‖) grant program 
aimed at reducing community exposure to toxics, see U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
Community Action for a Renewed Environment (CARE), http://www.epa.gov/care/ (last visited 
Dec. 2, 2009). 
 10. In 1999, the California Air Resources Board established a Neighborhood Assessment 
Program to evaluate cumulative air pollution on the neighborhood scale; the Bay Area Air 
Quality Management District launched its Community Air Risk Evaluation initiative in 2004. 
See KEN KLOC, ENVTL. LAW & JUSTICE CLINIC, GOLDEN GATE UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, ZONES OF 
INEQUITY: CUMULATIVE AIR POLLUTION AND HOT SPOTS IN THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA 
11, 20 (2009), http://www.ggu.edu/school_of_law/academic_law_program/environmental_law/ 
environmental_law_justice_clinic/attachment/Zones+of+Inequity.pdf. 
 Dr. Kloc recommends that regulators adopt a broad definition of cumulative risk, such as 
that adopted by the EPA Risk Assessment Forum in 2003 in its Framework for Cumulative Risk 
Assessment; he defines cumulative risk as ―the combined risks from aggregate exposures to 
multiple agents or stressors.‖ KLOC, supra, at 7 (quoting EPA RISK ASSESSMENT FORUM, 
FRAMEWORK FOR CUMULATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (2003)). Aggregate exposure in turn is 
defined as the total exposure to a stressor by ―relevant routes, pathways, and sources‖; stressors 
may be chemical, biological, or physical agents, or activities that alter or cause the loss of a 
necessity, whether through direct or Adopt enforceable measures to evaluate, limit and reduce 
cumulative health risks. KLOC, supra, at 7–8 (quoting EPA RISK ASSESSMENT FORUM, 
FRAMEWORK FOR CUMULATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (2003). 
 11. See U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 05-289, EPA SHOULD DEVOTE 
MORE ATTENTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE WHEN DEVELOPING CLEAN AIR RULES 3–6 
(2005) (discussing the limited attention given to environmental justice by the EPA).  
 12. See Clifford Rechtschaffen, The Evidence of Environmental Injustice, ENVTL. L. 
NEWS, Fall 2003, at 3 [hereinafter Rechtschaffen, Evidence of Environmental Injustice]; see 
also MICHAEL ASH ET AL., JUSTICE IN THE AIR: TRACKING TOXIC POLLUTION FROM 
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that race is more strongly correlated with this disparity than is any 
other variable, including income.
13
 The significant disparity in 
benefits and burdens raises more than legal and policy questions; it 
raises questions about who we are as a society. These moral questions 
are especially pressing because environmental vulnerability is but one 
of the many challenges that minority and low-income communities 
 
AMERICA‘S INDUSTRIES AND COMPANIES TO OUR STATES, CITIES, AND NEIGHBORHOODS 6–8 
(2009), http://college.usc.edu/geography/ESPE/documents/justice_air_web.pdf; PASTOR ET AL., 
STILL TOXIC, supra note 5; Jayajit Chakraborty & Marc P. Armstrong, Using Geographic 
Plume Analysis to Assess Community Vulnerability to Hazardous Accidents, 19 COMPUTERS, 
ENVTL. & URB. SYS. 341 (1995) (showing that minorities and low-income households are 
disproportionately exposed to toxic substances released in truck accidents); Robert B. Gunier et 
al., Traffic Density in California: Socioeconomic and Ethnic Differences among Potentially 
Exposed Children, 13 J. EXPOSURE ANALYSIS & ENVTL. EPIDEMIOLOGY 240–46 (2003) (noting 
that in California, the proportion of children of color living on blocks with high traffic density 
is inversely related to median family income, and that children of color are three times more 
likely to live in high-traffic areas than are white children); Lee, supra note 3, at 60–66; Clifford 
Rechtschaffen, Strategies for Implementing the Environmental Justice Vision, 1 GOLDEN GATE 
U. ENVTL. L.J. 321, 323 (2007) [hereinafter Rechtschaffen, Strategies].  
 13. Rechtschaffen, Evidence of Environmental Injustice, supra note 12, at 5–7; see also 
PASTOR ET AL., STILL TOXIC, supra note 5, at 8. The authors of the STILL TOXIC report explain 
the evidence this way: 
 The land use perspective suggests that hazards are located where complementary 
land uses, such as industrial facilities or traffic arteries, are clustered; therefore, any 
correlation of environmental ―bads‖ with race is viewed as an unfortunate byproduct 
of economic geography. The income view sees the role of property values as key: 
more hazardous land uses tend to be where income levels and property values are low, 
and co-location of the poor and toxics simply reflects the normal workings of the 
market system. In both perspectives, while health impacts could remain significant, 
environmental disparities are basically benign in intent . . . .  
 The power perspective suggests that hazard location and poor air quality depends on 
a community‘s ability—or inability—to resist placement of undesirable land uses in 
their neighborhood. In this view, discriminatory practices and/or power differentials 
are largely responsible for the patterns of environmental disparity that are frequently 
observed. And since race and power are so highly intertwined in our society, patterns 
of difference by race are suggestive of patterns of difference by power.  
 In the real world, all three of these factors—land use, income and power– are 
inextricably linked. Communities with less political voice may be less able to contest 
incompatible land uses, and income is not just a reflection of a market system but also 
a marker of influence in the decision-making process. Yet, if race still matters once 
land use and income levels are accounted for, this suggests that differential access to 
political power and policy voice may be important to consider and address in the 
regulatory process. 
PASTOR ET AL., STILL TOXIC, supra note 5, at 3. 
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face.
14
 Communities that are burdened with pollution and have less 
access to environmental benefits also suffer from crime, violence, 
chronic stress,
15
 lack of access to open space,
16
 minimal economic 
opportunities, inadequate public schools, and insufficient access to 
healthy foods.
17
 
 
 14. See Unnatural Causes . . . Is Inequality Making Us Sick?, Backgrounders from the 
Unnatural Causes Health Equity Database (2008), http://www.unnaturalcauses.org/assets/ 
uploads/file/primers.pdf [hereinafter Backgrounders]. In the United States, where you live is a 
good predictor of health. Id. at 11. You could even say that where you live can kill you: 
Studies have shown, for example, that living in a disadvantaged neighborhood leads to 
a 50–80% increase in risk for heart disease—the number one killer in America. One 
reason is chronic stress. Worrying about violence, lousy schools, and unpaid bills; 
living in substandard housing or a polluted environment; not having good access to 
fresh food, reliable transportation, or safe public spaces—all of these have a negative, 
even toxic effect on health. 
Unnatural Causes . . . Is Inequality Making Us Sick?: Place Matters (California Newsreel 2008) 
(episode transcript available at http://www.unnaturalcauses.org/assets/uploads/file/UC_ 
Description_All.pdf).  
 15. Researchers now have substantial evidence that chronic stress early in life correlates 
negatively to a human being‘s ability to cope later in life by affecting brain development. See 
Backgrounders, supra note 14, at 3. 
 16. See generally CHRISTOPHER H. FOREMAN, JR., THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 132–33 (1998). For recent studies on the distribution of benefits, see 
PAUL STANTON KIBEL, GOLDEN GATE UNIV. SCH. OF LAW CITY PARKS PROJECT, ACCESS TO 
PARKLAND: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AT EAST BAY PARKS (2007) (observing that the largest 
park system in the San Francisco Bay Area has most of its holdings in hillside areas, near 
affluent, white communities); see also Robert Garcia & Aubrey White, Warren County’s 
Legacy for Healthy Parks, Schools & Urban Communities: Park Victories from the Cornfield to 
El Congreso and Beyond, 1 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 127, 129–31 (2007). For an analysis 
linking the decline of Klamath River Salmon due to dam and water mismanagement to rates of 
heart disease and diabetes in Karuk tribal members, see KARI MARIE NORGAARD, THE EFFECTS 
OF ALTERED DIET ON THE HEALTH OF THE KARUK PEOPLE: A PRELIMINARY REPORT 26–31 
(2004) (on file with author). At the same time that the dams deprived the Karuk and other 
tribes, including the Yurok, of their connection to the river, the power from the dams did not 
serve the tribes: 
 It is a cruel irony that the hydropower facilities on the Klamath River do not provide 
power to most of the Yurok Reservation downstream of the dams. Nearly 80% of the 
Yurok Reservation is without a connection to the electric grid. Residents rely upon 
modest solar panels and portable generators for power; and otherwise, they live much 
as they did in the 19th century. The public elementary school located there relies upon 
noisy, polluting diesel generators for power.  
Scott W. Williams, The Boundaries of Winters—When the Courts Alone Are Not Enough to 
Protect Indian Reserved Rights, in THE FUTURE OF RESERVED WATER RIGHTS (Barbara Cosens 
& Judith Royster eds.) (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 20, n.12, on file with author). 
 17. See generally Dawson, supra note 3, at 368–71 (describing common characteristics of 
EJ communities). 
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Given these disparities, it is even more important to raise 
environmental justice as a societal concern, not simply as an issue for 
vulnerable communities.
 18
 Just as civil rights became a quest for all 
Americans, so too should environmental justice. How the most 
vulnerable segment of our society lives ultimately reflects on all of 
us. 
III. WHICH CASES DO ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE COMMUNITIES 
LITIGATE? 
Getting to Professor Spinak‘s question, why do our clients end up 
in court? Short of a comprehensive or systematic study of EJ 
litigation, I offer an impressionistic answer based on my experiences 
in EJ litigation and collaborations with EJ groups, as well as on cases 
discussed in the media.  
Despite the difficulties that judicial enforcement poses for 
citizens, which I discuss later in this Article, EJ advocates continue to 
have a sizeable litigation docket against polluters and regulators. This 
robust docket represents only a small fraction of meritorious cases: 
many are turned away because the few firms that represent EJ groups 
 
 18. The EPA‘s current Administrator, Lisa Jackson, recognizes the societal costs of 
pollution on the neighborhood level: 
Environmental justice can also be a ―force multiplier‖ for other issues.  
The people that get sick at two and three times the average rate because of pollution in 
their neighborhoods are the same people that predominantly get their health care in 
emergency rooms. That drives up costs system-wide, and hurts both the local and the 
nationwide economy.  
In our schools, when children are repeatedly missing class with asthma or allergies, it 
affects educational outcomes and long-term economic potential. . . .  
Or in the neighborhood, visible environmental degradation can compound problems. 
Businesses won‘t invest in that community and economic possibilities are limited. As a 
result crime is higher, violence is higher—often times drugs use is rampant—and the 
vicious cycle continues.  
Lisa P. Jackson, Administrator, U.S. EPA, Remarks to the National Environmental Justice 
Advisory Council (July 21, 2009) (transcript available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress. 
nsf/8d49f7ad4bbcf4ef852573590040b7f6/313ec9a2bc80d677852575fa007b3c42!OpenDocume
nt). In addition to the cumulative effects of socioeconomic vulnerabilities and pollution, 
socioeconomic vulnerabilities are thought to increase susceptibility to pollution. See Lee, supra 
note 3, at 61–64. 
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have limited litigation capacity. Most EJ litigation falls into one of 
several identifiable categories. 
A. Cases Challenging Siting of New Sources of Pollution or 
Expansion of Existing Sources 
Archetypal EJ litigation involves fighting off new sources of 
pollution. Indeed, many view the struggle of the predominantly 
African-American community in Warren County, North Carolina, to 
fight off a toxic dump as the case that spawned the environmental 
justice movement.
19
 The struggle that began in Warren County 
continues in communities throughout the nation. In most of these 
cases, residents are motivated by an overwhelming sense of fear and 
worry for their own health and for the health of their families and 
communities.
20
 
Recent cases from California illustrate this type of litigation. In 
the San Francisco Bay Area, when a Chevron refinery proposed to 
expand, several EJ groups sued the City of Richmond, which had 
conducted an environmental review of the project under California‘s 
equivalent of the National Environmental Policy Act. The EJ groups 
were successful, and the trial court set aside the project approval for, 
among other reasons, the city‘s failure to describe whether the project 
will process heavier crude slate than the refinery currently is 
processing and improper deferral of greenhouse gas mitigation 
measures.
21
  
 
 19. See, e.g., Dollie Burwell & Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice Comes Full Circle: 
Warren County Before and After 1 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 9, 10 (2007).  
 20. These feelings are common in people living near pollution that is ―involuntarily 
imposed, or regarded as beyond individual control.‖ Theresa A. Satterfield, Risk, Remediation 
and the Stigma of a Technological Accident in an African-American Community, 7 HUM. 
ECOLOGY REV. 1, 2 (2000); see also LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND 
UP: ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 
80–81 (2001) (describing the devastation and anger felt by community members and organizer 
Lupe Martinez, in reaction to incidents of death and disease in Buttonwillow, California, a host 
to a toxic dump). The standing declarations in the clinic‘s cases against repeat violators reflect 
similar emotions of fear, anger, and worry. 
 21. Cmtys. for a Better Env‘t v. City of Richmond, No. N08-1429 (Cal. Super. Ct, June 4, 
2009) (unreported minute order). 
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The City of Richmond has been described as a ―long-neglected 
urban neighborhood‖ in which  
Segregation and lack of access to jobs, nutritious foods, and 
safe, affordable housing have been harmful to the health of 
long-time African American residents  . . . . 
 . . . Richmond has higher than average rates of asthma 
hospitalization, higher rates of diabetes, and lower life 
expectancy. . . . Tobacco, liquor and fast food are everywhere, 
but fresh produce isn‘t. Quality affordable housing is hard to 
find, and so are safe places to play and exercise.
22
 
A city of about 100,000 residents, 80 percent of whom are people 
of color, Richmond is home to the Chevron refinery, as well as 
General Chemical Corporation, a sanitary landfill, and a Superfund 
site resulting from a former DDT formulation plant.
23
  
In Bayview Hunters-Point, also located in the San Francisco Bay 
Area, a local community group successfully stopped the City of San 
Francisco from exempting from environmental review a major 
expansion of a rendering plant into a plant that would produce ten 
million gallons of biodiesel annually.
24
 As described earlier, the 
Bayview Hunters-Point community is a recognized EJ community. 
In Southern California, an EJ group, in collaboration with a 
national environmental group, successfully stopped eleven power 
plant projects that were proposed for the Los Angeles area by 
prohibiting the regional air quality district from dispensing emissions 
 
 22. Unnatural Causes . . . Is Inequality Making Us Sick?: Place Matters, supra note 14. 
 23. See U.S. EPA, TOXIC RELEASE INVENTORY: 2007 CALIFORNIA REPORT, available at 
http://www.epa.gov/region/toxic/tri/report/07/CalStateReport-2007.pdf; Region 9: Superfund, 
United Heckathorn Co., http://yosemite.epa.gov/r9/sfund/r9sfdocw.nsf/vwsoalphabetic/United+ 
Heckathorn+Co.?OpenDocument (last visited Dec. 2, 2009) (EPA information about the United 
Heckathorn Superfund site in Richmond). According to the most recent report available, the 
Chevron refinery in Richmond was one of the top ten facilities in California for on-site and off-
site releases of chemicals reported on the Toxics Release Inventory forms. U.S. EPA, TOXICS 
RELEASE INVENTORY: 2007 CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra. 
 24. See Robert Selna, Environmentalists Delay S.F. Biodiesel Plans, S.F. CHRON., April 3, 
2009, at B-1, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/04/02/BAQ 
516RSCV.DTL. 
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credits to these plants that originally had been reserved for essential 
public services such as hospitals and schools.
25
 
B. Cases Challenging Rulemaking 
Typically, EJ groups do not directly become involved in national 
rulemaking.
26
 Rather, EJ groups bring cases against regulators that 
involve environmental laws with particularized local or regional 
impacts. For example, a coalition of former residents of 
Herculaneum, Missouri, who had been exposed to high levels of 
airborne lead filed a lawsuit to compel review of the National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards for lead, which had not been changed 
in three decades. The lawsuit resulted in more stringent national 
standards.
27
 Similarly, to ensure that pollution is minimized to the 
greatest extent allowed by law, EJ groups have challenged State 
Implementation Plans that are designed to achieve the National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards.
28
 Some EJ groups have filed suits 
 
 25. See SoCal Power Plants on Hold, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/greenspace/2008/07/ 
socal-power-pla.html (July 29, 2008, 18:59 PST). 
 26. I do not believe that the EJ groups‘ lack of participation in national rulemaking 
indicates a lack of interest. For example, a local community group in San Francisco shared 
common interests with large environmental groups that challenged EPA‘s Phase II rules 
governing cooling water intake structures from large, existing power plants. The local 
community group, Bayview Hunters Point Community Advocates, was interested in the rule 
because it was concerned with harm to marine organisms: many of the group‘s constituents fish 
in the San Francisco Bay for subsistence. But the group did not have the resources to participate 
in the litigation, and the large environmental groups provided excellent representation. 
 An exception to the general trend of EJ groups‘ lack of participation on national 
rulemaking challenges, however, may be in the greenhouse gases arena. Because of expected 
impacts on minority and low-income neighborhoods, some EJ groups have been actively 
involved in litigation involving greenhouse gases. See, e.g., Ass‘n of Irritated Residents v. U.S. 
Envtl. Protection Agency, 423 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2005). It is not surprising to see EJ groups 
litigating in this area because there is considerable disagreement between EJ groups and 
traditional environmental groups on how greenhouse gases should be regulated, mostly notably 
as to cap and trade. EJ groups oppose cap and trade. See, e.g., CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN, 
EILEEN GAUNA & CATHERINE A. O‘NEILL, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: LAW, POLICY AND 
REGULATION 424–25 (2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter RECHTSCHAFFEN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL 
JUSTICE LAW] (quoting Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice and Domestic Climate Change 
Policy, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10287 (2008)). 
 27. Felicity Barringer, E.P.A. Toughens Standard on Lead Emissions; Change Is the First 
in 3 Decades, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2008, at 15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/ 
10/17/washington/17epa.html.  
 28. Docket information from law school clinics that represent EJ groups in California 
refer to such cases. See Golden Gate University Environmental Law and Justice Clinic, 
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challenging specific air pollution regulation promulgated by regional 
air quality agencies, such as regulations applicable to open-air 
composting of sewage sludge.
29
 
Recent EJ lawsuits also include litigation against regulators for 
failing to take into consideration the particularized impacts of climate 
change that EJ communities are expected to suffer, including 
exacerbation of existing air pollution problems.
30
 
C. Cases against Pollution Sources 
Another category of cases EJ advocates typically litigate exhibits 
what Professors Eileen Gauna, Catherine O‘Neill, and Clifford and 
Rechtschaffen call the ―straw that breaks the camel‘s back‖ 
phenomenon.
31
 These cases emerge when burdened communities say 
that they ―cannot take it anymore‖ upon discovering yet another 
assault on their environment. As Lucy Ramos, president of Mothers 
of East Los Angeles, proclaimed in the context of a power plant her 
community is fighting: ―Our community is not a dumping ground.‖32  
While the cases challenging new or expanding pollution sources 
fall into this ―straw that breaks the camel‘s back‖ category, cases 
 
http://www.ggu.edu/school_of_law/academic_law_programs/jd_program/environmental_law/ 
environmental_law_justice_clinic/cases_and_clients (last visited Dec. 2, 2009); Tulane Law 
School Environmental Law Clinic, http://www.tulane.edu/~telc/assets/pdfs/ lawsuits.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 2, 2009); Washington University School of Law, Interdisciplinary Environmental 
Clinic News, http://law.wustl.edu/internv/index.asp?id=431 (last visited Dec. 2, 2009). 
 29. See, e.g., Helphinkley.org v. Mojave Desert Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., No. CIVBS 
800976 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 21, 2009) (challenging a rule governing composting facilities that 
process green waste and sewage sludge). The trial court determined that the air district violated 
the California Environmental Quality Act by failing to conduct environmental review of the 
composting rule. Id. at 6–7. The court determined that, because nearby air districts had more 
stringent rulings governing composting, including requiring an enclosure with an aeration 
system, there could be adverse environmental impacts from promulgating a less stringent rule, 
which could encourage additional siting of composting facilities in the region. Id. at 6. 
 30. See Ass’n of Irritated Residents, 423 F.3d at 995–97. Plaintiffs in these types of cases 
include local and regional EJ groups such as California Communities Against Toxics, Coalition 
for a Safe Environment and West County Toxics Coalition. See, e.g., Complaint at 1, Ass‘n of 
Irritated Residents v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., No. CPF-09-509 562 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 10, 2009). 
 31. See, e.g., Eileen Gauna, Catherine A. O‘Neill & Clifford Rechtschaffen, 
Environmental Justice 7 (Ctr. for Progressive Regulation, White Paper No. 505, 2005). 
 32. Judge‘s Ruling Throws Southern California Power Plants into Disarray, 
http://cbenewsarchives.blogspot.com/2009/01/judges-ruling-throws-southern.html (Jan. 14, 
2009, 15:14 PST).  
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against existing pollution sources fit the category as well. A local EJ 
group‘s case against a San Francisco power plant illustrates this type 
of litigation. In the midst of a claimed energy crisis in California in 
2001, the regional air quality district, the EPA, and Mirant Potrero 
(the operator of the power plant) entered into a Compliance and 
Mitigation Agreement, which allowed Mirant to exceed the permitted 
number of hours that its peaker plants could operate in a given year; 
in exchange, Mirant paid a penalty.
33
 The purpose of the agreement 
was to increase energy production by using peaker plants that had 
been designed for use only during periods of peak energy demand. 
The problem, from the community‘s perspective, was that these 
peaker plants burned diesel fuel, the combustion of which results in 
dirtier emissions than from natural gas.  
When the government‘s Compliance and Mitigation Agreement 
with the power plant became public in 2001, there were two power 
plants in the Bayview Hunters Point neighborhood, although one of 
the plants in the neighborhood has since closed through persistent and 
organized efforts of a coalition of community groups working 
together with the City of San Francisco. In addition to being home to 
the two power plants, the neighborhood also hosted a large sewage 
treatment plant and a number of maritime industries,
34
 including a 
fat-rendering plant and cement and aggregate plants. When the 
leaders of the Bayview Hunters Point Community Advocates group 
found out about the agreement, they were enraged that the 
 
 33. Compliance and Mitigation Agreement between Mirant Potrero, LLC and the Bay 
Area Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. (Mar. 29, 2001) (on file with the Environmental Law and Justice 
Clinic). The regulators were not settling past violations and requiring a plan for the power plant 
to come into compliance, in effect assisting the company‘s plan for future intentional violations. 
In a similar fashion, the same air district recently entered into an agreement with another power 
plant, forbearing from issuing a notice of violation or filing an enforcement action, even though 
the power plant did not have a valid permit to construct or operate its 530-megawatt plant. See 
Compliance Agreement between Pacific Gas & Electric Co. and Bay Area Air Quality Mgmt. 
Dist. (May 1, 2009) (on file with the Environmental Law and Justice Clinic); Letter from 
Deborah Jordan, Director, Air Division, EPA Region IX, to Randy S. Livingston, Vice 
President, Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Aug. 13, 2009) (on file with the clinic) (accompanying 
EPA‘s notice of violation to Pacific Gas & Electric, which alleges that the company did not 
have a valid pre-construction permit under the Clean Air Act).  
 34. Leslie Fulbright, Big Victory for Hunters Point Activists, S.F. CHRON., May 15, 2006, 
available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/05/15/MNGE4IRVT91. 
DTL. 
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government agencies charged with protecting their health had 
allowed future violations of the power plant‘s air permit. They sued 
both the air district and the power plant under the Clean Air Act‘s 
citizen suit provision,
35
 and successfully stopped the power plant 
from continuing the violation.
36
 
The same local group also successfully filed litigation against the 
city‘s transportation agency, which runs the municipal bus system, 
when it reneged on its obligation under an ordinance to retire the 
oldest and dirtiest diesel buses, which resulted in excess diesel 
emissions.
37
 
Clients also commonly ask the clinic to file claims against 
pollution sources that cause a nuisance. These suits typically allege 
that facilities emit intense and persistent odors or contaminated dust. 
Our clinic has received requests to investigate or file lawsuits against 
a yeast manufacturing company, a Kraft pulp mill, a steel foundry, 
and a large construction project disturbing naturally occurring 
asbestos-laden rocks. The clients in these cases describe odors or dust 
that interrupt their lives and prevent them from fully enjoying their 
homes, schools, and neighborhoods. The odors and dust deter them 
from leaving windows open, sitting in their backyards, gardening, 
walking, biking, and relaxing after work. Like residents living near 
other sources of pollution, residents who live near a nuisance are 
burdened with persistent worries about their families‘ and their own 
health.
38
 Unfortunately, nuisances are not well regulated by state or 
federal pollution control laws.
39
  
 
 35. The citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006). 
 36. Bayview Hunters Point Cmty. Advocates v. Mirant Potrero, LLC, No. C-01-2348-PJH 
(N.D. Cal.) (consent decree entered Oct. 30, 2001). 
 37. Bayview Hunters Point Cmty. Advocates v. S.F. Mun. Transp. Agency, No. CPF-07-
507960 (Cal. Super. Ct., filed Dec. 28, 2007); Bayview Hunters Point Cmty. Advocates v. S.F. 
Mun. Transp. Agency, Settlement Agreement and Release (July 15, 2008). 
 38. See, e.g., Satterfield, supra note 20, at 3–6 (studying the emotional impact of a toxic 
dust nuisance). 
 39. See NOGA MORAG-LEVINE, CHASING THE WIND: REGULATING AIR POLLUTION IN 
THE COMMON LAW STATE 24–26 (2003). 
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D. The Common Thread in EJ Litigation 
This informal sampling of EJ litigation shows that litigation 
results from the EJ groups‘ decision that the level of pollution in their 
neighborhood is ―too much,‖ or that the pollution significantly 
interferes with their quality of life.
40
 EJ lawsuits thus address 
governments‘ failures to enforce regulations that would improve the 
environment; the siting or expansion of additional pollution sources; 
and violations of permit limits by either large sources that dominate 
the ―pollution-scape‖ of the neighborhood or by sources that cause a 
nuisance.
41
  
EJ clients pursue litigation because it may be the only way to get a 
seat at the table with the regulators and sources of pollution. 
Litigation is uniquely successful in motivating pollution sources to 
 
 40. There are also EJ groups, including Native American tribes, that file litigation for 
benefits denied. See, e.g., Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm‘n, 611 F. Supp. 2d 994 (N.D. 
Cal. 2009); Williams, supra note 16. They are an important species of EJ litigation but are 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
 41. The conclusion that that EJ litigation results from neighborhood pollution is 
unsurprising because EJ groups typically are formed to address that particular problem. For 
example, Bayview Hunters Point Community Advocates was formed ―to ensure environmental 
justice, to promote economic alternatives that contribute to the development of environmentally 
safe neighborhoods and livelihoods and to secure the political, economic, cultural and social 
liberation of this community.‖ See Complaint at 4, Bayview Hunters Point Cmty. Advocates v. 
Mirant Potrero, LLC, No. C-01-2348-PJH (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2001). Communities for a Better 
Environment states that its mission is ―to achieve environmental health and justice by building 
grassroots power in and with communities of color and working-class communities.‖ 
Communities for a Better Environment Mission, http://www.cbecal.org/about/mission.html 
(last visited Dec. 2, 2009). The mission of national environmental groups, on the other hand, is 
to improve the environment in general. See, e.g., Natural Resource Defense Council (NRDC), 
http://www.nrdc.org/about/mission.asp (last visited Dec. 2, 2009) (NRDC‘s mission is ―to 
safeguard the Earth: its people, its plants and animals and the natural systems on which all life 
depends‖). It would also be safe to say that national environmental groups have followed the 
public interest litigation model, focusing on ―policy-oriented cases, where a decision will affect 
large numbers of people or advance a major law reform objective.‖ GERALD N. ROSENBERG, 
THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 5 n.3 (1991) (quoting a 
1976 Council for Public Interest Law study). When large environmental groups work on 
neighborhood pollution as an issue apart from a campaign that they might have, they appear to 
work in collaboration with community groups. For example, NRDC assisted a group in a 
community which is 98 percent people of color, sue a foam manufacturer in South Los Angeles, 
after regulators failed to enforce longstanding violations of air quality laws. See MICHAEL E. 
WALL, MIRIAM ROTKIN-ELLMAN & GINA SOLOMON, NATURAL RES. DEFENSE COUNCIL, AN 
UNEVEN SHIELD: THE RECORD OF ENFORCEMENT AND VIOLATIONS UNDER CALIFORNIA‘S 
ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH, AND WORKPLACE SAFETY LAWS 24 (2008).  
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negotiate with community groups. Lawsuits force corporate decision 
makers to consider the merits and practicalities of their position at 
every stage of the case—from answering the complaint, to deciding 
whether to file motions to dismiss or for summary judgment, and 
eventually to devising positions for mandatory settlement 
conferences. The same is true when the lawsuit is filed against a 
regulator. Lawsuits force regulators to retract decisions that are 
without basis. In addition, where judicial decisions are necessary for 
statutory or regulatory interpretations, litigation is the only available 
recourse. 
IV. IS EJ LITIGATION THE BEST STRATEGY FOR SOLVING 
NEIGHBORHOOD POLLUTION PROBLEMS? 
Before I consider whether litigation is the best strategy for solving 
neighborhood pollution problems, I must first emphasize that I do not 
question EJ groups‘ place in the court system. EJ advocates 
undoubtedly agree that citizens‘ ability to enforce laws is a positive 
jurisprudential development, and we passionately decry decisions that 
erode our access to the courts. We do so for good reason. Without 
private enforcement, federal environmental statutes might merely be 
laws on the books rather than effective cleanup or pollution 
prevention tools. Without access to courts, our clients‘ communities 
undoubtedly would have dirtier air, water, and soil. Without the 
ability to go to court, our clinic‘s clients would not have any legal 
recourse against polluters who exceed permit limits without 
censure—and sometimes with explicit permission—from the very 
regulators who are tasked with enforcement. The clients would still 
have attempted political and possibly legislative fixes, but one 
important tool—judicial enforcement—would be missing from their 
arsenal. 
It is still useful, however, to examine whether litigation 
necessarily is the best strategy for solving neighborhood pollution 
problems. I argue that litigation is insufficient to address cumulative 
pollution or nuisance sources because, in addition to being resource 
intensive and difficult to pursue, it does not have the potential to cure 
the root cause of the problem of cumulative pollution. In addition, 
while litigation may be successful in addressing particular nuisance 
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sources, they tend to cause a nuisance wherever they operate, which 
suggests that broader national regulation, rather than individual 
litigation, is necessary to address the problems that they create.  
A. Problems Inherent in Private Enforcement and EJ Litigation 
As Professor Spinak notes in the context of family court, courts 
and indigent clients will always have few resources, and courts are 
not always the best fora for problem solving. EJ advocates agree.  
First, private environmental enforcement presents many 
challenges. Judicial fora are not often favorable to our clients because 
court cases require extensive investment of both time and money. 
Environmental plaintiffs must secure funds to hire experts and be 
ready to pay other costs of litigation. Once in court, there are other 
obstacles; for example, a union may seek to intervene on behalf of 
the defendant that you have sued, or the defendant may claim that it 
has a settlement that is imminent with the government.
42
 Legislation 
enacted after a litigation victory may upset the result the plaintiffs 
achieve in litigation. And, court cases can take a long time.  
Moreover, even when it is possible to prove that a polluter is 
violating its permit limits, courts rarely shut down facilities. It is 
often incomprehensible to lay clients that a facility whose pollution 
control equipment is insufficient to comply with the law nonetheless 
will be allowed to operate. One‘s driver‘s license may be revoked for 
driving under the influence, but not so with air pollution permits. 
Additionally, litigation outcomes are never certain. Cases involving 
technical determinations pose different and additional challenges. For 
example, few engineers, air quality modelers, and health experts are 
available to community groups, and Clean Air Act cases may require 
one or more of these experts.
43
  
 
 42. In one case, even though the defendant asked the court on April 11, 2006, to stay 
discovery and set a later trial date because it was discussing settlement with the U.S. EPA, the 
consent decree between the government and the defendant was not lodged until October 2, 
2007. Joint Case Management Statement and Proposed Case Management Order at 10, 
Californians for Alternatives to Toxics v. Evergreen Pulp, Inc., No. CIV 06-00002 (N.D. Cal. 
Apr. 11, 2006); Californians for Alternatives to Toxics v. Evergreen Pulp, Inc., No. CIV 06-
00002 (N.D. Cal.) (consent decree entered Oct. 2, 2007). 
 43. For a discussion of the practical limitations of private enforcement, see generally 
Eileen Gauna, Federal Enforcement of Citizen Provisions: Obstacles and Incentives on the 
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Statutory environmental cases also present narrative challenges—
environmental stories are not easy to tell, and in some instances they 
encounter uncomprehending audiences. For example, in a case 
involving a permit violation, the statutorily created proof structure 
enables enforcers to move for summary judgment on liability by 
presenting evidence that the defendant has a permit limit and, 
according to the defendant‘s own information, has exceed the permit 
limit. That narrative reflects the evidence, and yet it lacks emotional 
appeal. This narrative challenge exists not only for environmental 
justice advocates, but also for government enforcers and large 
environmental groups that act as citizen enforcers. 
Sometimes the narrative is more complicated. The Bayview 
Hunters Point compliance and mitigation agreement case referred to 
earlier illustrates the complex narrative challenges that environmental 
justice advocates face. In that case, the two agencies charged with 
enforcing the Clean Air Act, the regional air district and the EPA, 
documented their decision not to enforce permit violations in a 
Compliance and Mitigation Agreement, in which the regulators 
explicitly allowed future violations of the power plant‘s permit 
limits.
44
 When government agencies actively condone violations, 
either through variance agreements or so-called compliance 
agreements, it presents a particularly difficult narrative challenge for 
citizen enforcers.
45
 
Likewise, regulators‘ election of remedies can present narrative 
challenges. Sometimes, regulators do not push for the remedy that the 
community believes is appropriate and just. In one Environmental 
Law and Justice Clinic case, for example, the community groups 
believed, based on expert reports and the company‘s past compliance 
history, that a paper mill should install a specific piece of pollution 
control equipment to cure recurring permit violations for particulate 
 
Road to Environmental Justice, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1995), and Jim Hecker, The Difficulty of 
Citizen Enforcement of the Clean Air Act, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 303 (2004). 
 44. See Compliance and Mitigation Agreement between Mirant Potrero, LLC and the Bay 
Area Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. (Mar. 29, 2001) (on file with the Environmental Law and Justice 
Clinic). 
 45. Unfortunately, such agreements are not uncommon for the air districts in California, 
whose hearing boards have authority to grant variances. This authority has a statutory basis. See 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 42350–42364 (2006).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
140 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 31:121 
 
 
matter. This equipment was more expensive to install and operate 
than that which the EPA required. In that case, the EPA was only 
willing to push for less expensive retrofits because the agency 
expected those changes to resolve the Clean Air Act violations. 
While the citizens ultimately were able to obtain the more stringent 
pollution controls in settlement, the difference in the positions of the 
EPA and the citizens created a challenge in the case. 
These challenges exist because, where governments‘ positions are 
inconsonant with those of citizens, courts tend to view governments 
as the primary enforcers of environmental laws and regulations, 
despite the important role that Congress contemplated for citizens.
46
 
Thus, citizens are adversaries not only to polluters, but also to 
government. While some courts view citizens in the role in which 
Congress envisioned them when it enacted citizens‘ provisions into 
our national environmental laws, others view citizens as interfering 
with the sovereign‘s prosecutorial or environmental decision making. 
In addition to these challenges, many of which are also applicable 
to environmental litigation generally (and not just to EJ litigation), EJ 
advocates have pointed out that litigation can have the effect of 
disempowering communities because lawyers, not community 
members themselves, lead the representation.
47
 
B. EJ Litigation’s Potential to Get at the Root Cause of Such 
Litigation 
Despite the many difficulties inherent in private enforcement by 
EJ groups, a substantial number of these groups end up in court to 
enforce environmental laws. The existence of this active docket, 
however, does not speak to its ability to resolve the underlying 
problem of cumulative pollution or nuisance sources. One way to test 
the efficacy of EJ litigation is to ask the three questions that activist-
scholar Luke Cole used in his advocacy, which is rooted in the 
community empowerment model: Will the strategy educate people, 
including clients, policymakers, decision makers, and the public? 
 
 46. See Robin Kundis Craig, Should There Be a Constitutional Right to a Clean and 
Healthy Environment?, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 11013, 11014–17 (2004). 
 47. See, e.g., RECHTSCHAFFEN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 433. 
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Will the advocacy build a movement? Does the strategy address the 
cause rather than the symptoms of a problem?
48
  
1. Will Litigation Educate People about Neighborhood Pollution?  
Litigation probably will not educate people about cumulative 
pollution. EJ groups who bring the litigation already are acutely 
aware of the general problem, whether they articulate it as a problem 
of cumulative pollution or, as Lucy Ramos does, as ―enough is 
enough.‖49 Indeed, the focus on the need to address cumulative 
pollution from the point of view of the receptor, the community that 
breathes the pollution and, more broadly, is exposed to the soil and 
drinks polluted water or eats contaminated fish, is among the most 
important contributions of the environmental justice movement to 
environmental regulation.
50
 That is, ―straw on the camel‘s back‖ 
litigation comes precisely from what the community already knows 
to be multiple assaults on its system from the environment.
51
 The 
public at large probably already has heard groups complain that they 
have ―had enough‖ of their share of pollution.  
 
 48. Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for 
Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 668 (1992). 
 49. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.  
 50. To be sure, the Clean Air Act sets caps on cumulative air pollution in the sense that it 
requires the EPA Administrator to publish National Ambient Air Quality Standards for each 
criteria pollutant. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2006). But these caps are specific for each criteria pollutant 
and are not set at a neighborhood level. In addition, the Prevention of Significant Deterioration 
provisions of the Act require proposed sources in attainment areas to demonstrate the impact of 
the emissions on air quality. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470–7492. But again, the relevant geographical 
area is the air quality region, which can be quite large—at times the entire state. In addition, the 
analysis of impacts is performed one pollutant at a time. Human beings obviously do not 
breathe one pollutant at a time. For an excellent analysis of how existing statutory and 
regulatory schemes do not address cumulative pollution, see Annise Katherine Maguire, Note, 
Permitting under the Clean Air Act: How Current Standards Impose Obstacles to Achieving 
Environmental Justice, 14 MICH. J. RACE & L. 255 (2009). Maguire‘s Note points out that: 
[The Toxic Air Contaminants] Summary [in Marathon‘s permit application] identifies 
ninety-one different pollutants that will be emitted, including many chemicals known 
to have acute, and often carcinogenic and/or chronic effects . . . However, because 
Marathon‘s application states that all ninety-one chemicals individually satisfy the 
health-based screening levels, Marathon need not undertake any additional analysis. 
Id. at 274. 
 51. See Gauna et al., supra note 31, at 7. 
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Policymakers and decision makers are unlikely to be educated by 
litigation. When such parties are sued about particular rulemaking—
say under the National Ambient Air Quality Standards that deal with 
lead, which I discussed earlier
52—the pleadings in the lawsuit are 
unlikely to raise cumulative pollution as an issue because they tend to 
be narrowly framed around the statutory violation. ―[F]raming issues 
in legally sounds ways robs them of ‗political and purposive appeal 
. . . ‘ [T]he technical nature of legal arguments can denude issues of 
emotional, widespread appeal.‖53 Even if litigation can educate 
people about cumulative pollution, it is an oblique way to do so. 
As to neighborhood nuisances, litigation certainly will generate 
press about the particular source of the nuisance and thus educate 
members of the public who otherwise had not known about the 
problem, but media attention generally does not focus on the source 
for long. In addition, long before there is litigation about a nuisance 
source, regulators are likely to know about the source through 
community complaints of odor or dust; litigation therefore does not 
necessarily add any educational value.
54
  
2. Will Litigation Build a Movement?  
In my experience, litigation about a new or expanding source or 
an environmental bad actor in the neighborhood rarely builds a 
movement. Litigation may result from a movement to clean up the 
neighborhood, but not the other way around. The potential for 
movement building in a suit against a regulator is even less bright. 
Much of the action occurs in the lawyers‘ offices, not in the streets or 
 
 52. See supra notes 27 and 28 and accompanying text. 
 53. ROSENBERG, supra note 41, at 121 (quoting JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1978)). 
 54. Surrounding the period when a Clean Air Act enforcement action was filed against the 
nation‘s third largest foundry in Communities for a Better Environment v. Pacific Steel Co., 
community members made 549 odor complaints in a seven month period to the regional air 
district. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff CBE‘s Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction, Cmtys. for a Better Env‘t v. Pacific Steel Casting Co., No. C 06 4184 
BZ, 2006 WL 2703351 (N.D. Cal., filed Aug. 16, 2006); see also Website of Councilmember 
Linda Maio, City of Berkeley, http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/ContentDisplay.aspx?id=37072 
(last visited Dec. 2, 2009). The foundry‘s odor problem was well known to the air district, 
which had issued an abatement order in 1983. See MORAG-LEVINE, supra note 39, at 159–60. 
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community halls.
55
 ―‗[L]egal tactics not only absorb scarce resources 
that could be used for popular mobilization . . . [but also] make it 
difficult to develop broadly based, multiissue grassroots associations 
of sustained citizen allegiance.‘‖56 
3. Will Litigation at Least Address the Cause of the Problem and 
Not Just the Symptoms?  
Litigation does have the potential to offer case-specific solutions 
to additional pollution or wrongheaded regulations that EJ groups are 
attempting to fight. This is the primary reason to bring EJ litigation. 
However, litigation does not have the potential to address the cause 
of cumulative pollution. Elevated background pollution will exist in 
EJ communities, even if particular litigation is successful in fighting 
off a proposed new or expanded facility.
57
 The Bayview Hunters 
Point community, for example, has successfully fought off a 
proposed expansion of the Potrero power plant, but the community 
remains concerned about the pollution that already exists.
58
 
Litigation has the potential to address aspects of nuisance 
problems. But tort litigation is difficult at best, and, even in 
successful cases, abatement of the problem is not a guaranteed 
remedy.
59
 Moreover, litigation under statutory environmental 
provisions can only produce relief that incidentally addresses the 
nuisance. For example, community members may privately enforce 
permit limits on volatile organic compounds and thereby reduce 
odors, but the limits may not be set low enough to eliminate the 
 
 55. See Richard Toshiyuki Drury, Rousing the Restless Majority: The Need for a Blue-
Green-Brown Alliance, 19 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1 (2004) (discussing the challenges of building 
a more cohesive and inclusive environmental movement). As Bradley Angel states, ―if not 
careful and if not complementing a community organizing strategy, litigation can disempower a 
movement.‖ E-mail from Bradley Angel, supra note 7. 
 56. ROSENBERG, supra note 42, at 12 (quoting MICHAEL MCCANN, TAKING REFORM 
SERIOUSLY: PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC INTEREST LIBERALISM (1986)). 
 57. See Maguire, supra note 50, at 264–67. 
 58. Conversations with Karen Pierce, President, Bayview Hunters Point Community 
Advocates (July 1, 2009). 
 59. See Melissa Toffolon-Weiss & J. Timmons Roberts, Toxic Torts, Public Interest Law, 
and Environmental Justice: Evidence from Louisiana, 26 LAW & POL‘Y 259, 280–84 (2004) 
(discussing remedial limitations as one of many challenges in bringing complex environmental 
justice cases). 
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nuisance.
60
 In addition, there may be sources of odors other than 
volatile organic compounds, and a lawsuit to enforce limits on 
specific chemicals will not address those alternative sources. 
Professor Morag-Levine has also painstakingly documented that 
nuisance-based odor regulations administered by regional air quality 
districts rarely work.
61
 Such regimes rely on detection and 
confirmation of the complaints by government inspectors, who often 
cannot show up in time to make a confirmation.
62
  
In short, piecemeal litigation directed at a problem source or 
regulation fails the test of the community empowerment model. 
Looking at the same issue from another vantage point, environmental 
problems are systemic problems,
63
 and such issues can rarely be 
addressed solely through litigation.
64
  
 
 60. This situation occurred with Pacific Steel Casting, the third largest foundry in the 
nation, which is located in West Berkeley, California. The company‘s installation of a carbon 
adsorption system in 2006 reduced the number of odor complaints from the community, but 
strong odor is still a problem for residents who live or work nearby. Carbon absorption takes 
out a certain percentage of volatile organic compounds, which are responsible for the odor, 
before the foundry emissions are released to the outside air. Cmtys. for a Better Env‘t v. Pacific 
Steel Casting Co., No. C06-4184-BZ (N.D. Cal Mar. 16, 2007) (consent decree entered). 
Professor Morag-Levine describes the residents‘ struggle with the same company in the 1980s 
in her book, CHASING THE WIND. See MORAG-LEVINE, supra note 39, at ix–xi, 154–61. 
 61. MORAG-LEVINE, supra note 39, at 143–78. 
 62. Professor Morag-Levine describes her personal experience with the complaint 
process: 
[W]e often were unable to have our complaints confirmed. In the interval between our 
phone call and the arrival of the inspector, the odor often disappeared as a result of 
shifts in wind direction or in the foundry‘s production processes. The inspector would 
arrive and sniff the air but neither she nor I could detect any trace of the smell. . . . 
Even our hard-won successes in confirmation did not usually trigger action, because 
five separate confirmations during a twenty-four hour period were required before the 
Air District would issue a citation to the foundry. 
Id. at ix–x. 
 63. See, e.g., Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The 
Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L. Q. 619, 642 (1992) (―Environmental laws 
are not designed by or for poor people. The theory and ideology behind environmental laws 
ignores the systemic genesis of pollution.‖). 
 64. Some would say that litigation has failed to produce social reform in ―education, 
voting, transportation, accommodations and public places, and housing.‖ ROSENBERG, supra 
note 41, at 70–71. Rosenberg concludes that ―a closer examination reveals that before Congress 
and the executive branch acted, courts had virtually no direct effect on ending discrimination‖ 
in those areas. Id. at 70. ―Only when Congress and the executive branch acted in tadem with the 
courts did change occur in these fields. In terms of judicial effects, then, Brown [v. Board of 
Education] and its progeny stand for the proposition that courts are impotent to produce 
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If litigation targeting a specific problem does not achieve reform, 
could there be impact litigation directed at neighborhood pollution, 
such as cumulative pollution? A plausible cause of action for such 
impact litigation would be against government agencies involved in 
permitting pollution facilities, but these types of cases have proved to 
be very difficult.
65
 Practically speaking, then, impact litigation to 
address neighborhood pollution, even in its limited form—i.e., 
against recipients of government funding—is unlikely to effect 
reform.  
V. REFORMS TO ADDRESS NEIGHBORHOOD POLLUTION 
Government agencies regulating pollution have not implemented 
meaningful reforms to address environmental justice. This gap speaks 
more to the lack of political will than to the lack of good ideas. 
Because EJ groups have unique knowledge of the problem of 
neighborhood pollution, recommendations on regulation of 
cumulative exposure or risks and nuisance sources already are part of 
the recommendations to achieve environmental justice in general.  
A. Specific Recommendations to Improve Cumulative Air Pollution in 
EJ Communities 
In this part, I will discuss some recommendations for achieving 
environmental justice at the neighborhood level.
66
 Although many of 
 
significant social reform.‖ Id at 71. 
 65. See Bradford C. Mank, Title VI, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES 
AND PROCEDURES TO ADDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS 35 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 1999); 
Philip Weinberg, Equal Protection, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES AND 
PROCEDURES TO ADDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS, supra, at 12–15. But exceptions are 
bound to exist, and Miller v. City of Dallas, No. Civ. A. 3:98-CV-2955 D, 2002 WL 230834 
(N.D. Tex. 2002), may be worth studying to determine whether the plaintiffs obtained any city-
wide injunctive relief. In denying the city‘s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff‘s claim 
that Dallas engaged in race-based discrimination in zoning, the Miller court found that the 
effect of the city‘s practices along with its ―sordid history of . . . racially-segregated zoning and 
related policies . . . offers substantial circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent.‖ Miller, 
2002 WL 230834, at *7. The case settled after this decision. However, a recent case involving 
allegations of racially discriminatory transit funding, Darensburg v. Metropolitan 
Transportation Commission, 611 F. Supp. 2d 994 (N.D. Cal. 2009), illustrates that it is still 
difficult to prove disparate impact claims. 
 66. One of the most difficult challenges to achieving environmental justice at the 
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these recommendations do not directly address cumulative pollution, 
their implementation would at least lessen the existing disparities. 
1. Ending the Exemption of Old Facilities from Requirements to 
Update Pollution Controls 
Citing in part EJ communities‘ concern about the oldest and 
dirtiest facilities that typically are present in their communities, a 
panel of the National Academy of Public Administration 
recommended that Congress end grandfathering of existing facilities 
and instead require them to install state-of-the art pollution controls 
within ten years, if they had not previously undergone such a 
process.
67
 The panel pointed out that, in enacting the new source 
 
neighborhood level is that equitable solutions necessarily involve land use decisions: site 
selection for locally unwanted uses, the process for making that decision, and the ability of 
communities to participate in that decision. See Lee, supra note 3, at 67. While it is not my 
intent to address land use reforms, thoughtful recommendations worthy of mention include the 
following: 
a. Incorporate environmental justice concerns as a factor to consider and discuss in 
local comprehensive plans.
 
Patricia Salkin, Zoning and Land Use Planning, 32 REAL 
EST. L.J. 429, 432–33 (2004). 
b. Ensure meaningful public participation of EJ communities in the development of 
zoning, rezoning and planning laws and local comprehensive plants. See Salkin, supra, 
at 435–37. 
c. Survey grandfathered uses that do not conform to local zoning laws to determine 
whether those uses pose environmental disparities and target them for closure.
 
Salkin, 
supra, at 440 (citing Michael B. Gerrard, Environmental Justice and Local Land Use 
Decisionmaking, in TRENDS IN LAND USE LAW FROM A TO Z: ADULT USES TO 
ZONING 148 (Patricia E. Salkin ed., 2001)). Local amortization laws can facilitate the 
closure. Salkin, supra, at 440. 
d. Impose restrictions on uses that impact EJ. Salkin, supra, at 429–30. 
e. Impose additional requirements on pollution sources in EJ communities. Salkin, 
supra, at 443. 
f. Provide standards to limit certain nuisance-like activities. Salkin, supra, at 443–44. 
g. Establish a buffer between incompatible land usees. Salkin, supra, at 443. 
See also RECHTSCHAFFEN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 360 (discussing 
an Alabama law that prohibits more than one commercial hazardous waste treatment facility per 
county). These land use reform ideas, however, compete with political forces calling for 
economic development. See Dawson, supra note 3, at 399, 401–02. In this regard, Joe Lyou of 
California Environmental Rights Alliance has an interesting idea. He believes that a local 
ordinance that mimics red-light district ordinances would serve EJ communities well. 
 67. NAT‘L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., BREATH OF FRESH AIR: REVIVING THE NEW SOURCE 
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(―NSR‖) provisions of the Clean Air Act,68 Congress did not envision 
that these old facilities would continue operating beyond twenty-five 
years, but many old factories are still operating and have not 
upgraded their pollution controls.
69
 This proposal is now more than 
six years old, and nothing has been done to advance it. It is one of the 
most important proposals for national regulation because it would 
have a significant impact on neighborhood pollution. 
2. Capping (but Not Trading) Air Pollution  
The Bay Area Environmental Health Collaborative (―BAEHC‖), 
which was formed to address neighborhood cumulative air pollution, 
has developed a detailed air pollution reduction protocol. The 
protocol asks the regional air district to ―prohibit new point sources 
and air emission increases at existing sources‖ in EJ communities that 
are highly impacted by such pollution.
70
 To implement the 
prohibition, the air district would be required to designate high-
impact areas based on a calculation of risk-weighted air emissions.
71
  
Existing schemes, such as NSR requirements to offset new 
pollution in areas that fail to attain the National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards, also offer a potential structure for limiting the total level 
of neighborhood air pollution.
72
 Under what are known as 
nonattainment new source review provisions, the Clean Air Act 
 
REVIEW PROGRAM 21–22 (2003). See also Gauna et al., supra note 31, at 6.  
 68. The Clean Air Act sets ―standards of performance‖ for new sources of pollution. 42 
U.S.C. § 7411 (2006). 
 69. NAT‘L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., supra note 67, at 14, 23. 
 70. BAY AREA ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH COLLABORATION, PROPOSED BAY AREA AIR 
POLLUTION REDUCTION PROTOCOL 1 (2009), http://baehc.org/downloadables/BAEHC_ 
PollutionReductionProtocol_March2009.pdf [hereinafter PROTOCOL]. Some also call these 
high-impact or EJ communities ―sacrifice zones.‖ See Dayna Nadine Scott, Confronting 
Chronic Pollution: A Socio-Legal Analysis of Risk and Precaution, 46 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 
293, 318–19 (2008). 
 71. PROTOCOL, supra note 70, at 1, 3.  
 72. At the local level, there have been two ordinances that address mitigation or offset of 
emissions. Huntington Park, California, has a zoning ordinance that requires mitigation and 
reduction of adverse environmental impacts. Chester, Pennsylvania, has adopted an ordinance 
that prohibits new facilities from increasing pollution. See RECHTSCHAFFEN ET AL., 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 360 (citing NAT‘L ACAD. PUB. ADMIN., 
ADDRESSING COMMUNITY CONCERNS: HOW ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE RELATES TO LAND USE 
PLANNING AND ZONING (2003)).  
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requires large new or modification of sources, called major sources or 
major modifications, to offset certain kinds of new air pollution.
73
 In 
addition to regulating major sources of pollution, regulators can 
require new sources—regardless of size—to offset air pollutants that 
cause neighborhood impacts, so that there is no net increase in EJ 
communities. For capping to work effectively to address cumulative 
pollution in the neighborhood, however, offsets must occur for new 
pollution at the same facility. Grant programs to small sources could 
be established to assist these sources in complying with new 
regulations to counter the argument that this type of regulation is too 
burdensome. 
3. Eliminating the Use of Emission Reduction Credits in EJ 
Communities 
One of the greatest injustices of air pollution regulation and 
enforcement is that sources violating air quality laws rarely are 
required to offset the excess emissions that result from their 
violations. On the other hand, these sources routinely request 
emission reduction credits and bank them for future expansion 
projects or use them in lieu of required pollution reduction projects. 
This imbalance should be fixed by prohibiting the use of emission 
reduction credits in EJ communities. Without these credits, sources 
operating old, dirty facilities will be forced to upgrade their pollution 
controls. 
In addition, when sources in EJ communities violate air quality 
laws, enforcers should attempt to require cancellation of emission 
reduction credits owned by such sources in an amount equal to or 
exceeding the excess emissions resulting from their violations.  
 
 73. See 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a)(1)(A) (2006). The new source review provisions govern 
criteria air pollutants. See id. §§ 7407(d), 7501(2) (2006); ARNOLD W. REITZE, JR., AIR 
POLLUTION CONTROL LAW: COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 33 (2001). 
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4. Building on Measures Already Implemented by Other Air 
Quality Regulators 
EJ communities are awaiting real changes that address cumulative 
pollution and are tired of government regulators paying lip service to 
environmental justice while proceeding with business as usual. To 
counter this perception, regulators must take specific steps to address 
cumulative pollution at the neighborhood level.  
Having taken bolder steps than most agencies in setting a 
regulatory agenda for environmental justice under the leadership of 
its current Governing Board, the South Coast Air Quality 
Management District (―SCAQMD‖) established a multi-year plan to 
address environmental justice concerns.
74
 Under this program, the air 
district enacted fleet rules, which are both historic and remarkable. 
The fleet rules target diesel exhaust from transit buses, trash trucks, 
street sweepers, airport taxis, school buses, and other fleets. 
SCAQMD adopted the rules after an extensive study, which found 
diesel exhaust responsible for approximately 70 percent of the total 
cancer risk from air pollution and emissions from mobile sources 
responsible for 90 percent of the cancer risk. The study also found 
that the highest cancer risk occurs in areas near ports and along major 
freeways.
75
  
In the San Francisco Bay Area, as a result of BAEHC‘s advocacy, 
the air district has designated six ―priority zones,‖ and has proposed 
to limit risks from emissions of toxic air contaminants from new and 
modified sources in these zones.
76
 The district‘s proposal, however, 
does not account for risks from existing sources, and thus, while a 
step in the right direction, is still an incomplete effort. 
Other regulators can follow and build on these approaches. First, 
committing to a multi-year plan, as SCAQMD has done, will ensure 
that a program enjoys consistency from year to year; it reflects the 
commitment of the governing board; and it is not simply an 
afterthought. Second, other regulators can move relatively quickly to 
 
 74. See SCAQMD, History of Environmental Justice, http://www.aqmd.gov/ej/history. 
htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2009).  
 75. See AQMD Launches Major Study of Toxic Air Pollution in Southland, Feb. 5, 2004, 
http://www.aqmd.gov/news1/2004/matesiiipr.html. 
 76. KLOC, supra note 10, at 4. 
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implement specific regulatory programs, such as enacting similar 
fleet rules and establishing priority zones, to instill confidence in the 
government‘s resolve to address components of cumulative pollution.  
5. Starting with the Definitional Challenge: Lack of Data Is an 
Opportunity for Collaboration with Community Groups 
Despite EJ groups‘ ability to define and identify an EJ 
community, regulators struggle to define EJ communities. 
Collaborative work with community groups would help regulators to 
identify the areas where cumulative pollution is a problem and focus 
their attention accordingly.  
B. Limitations of the Recommendations to Address Cumulative 
Pollution and Suggestion for Government Commitment and Citizen 
Involvement 
One of the limitations to both the elimination of grandfathering 
and the requirement for capping pollution in EJ communities is that 
not all air pollutants can be effectively eliminated with technology, 
and not all air pollutants are regulated. Moreover, EJ communities 
would have to monitor new sources going in to ensure that no net 
pollution increases are occurring. EJ groups currently do not have the 
resources to routinely monitor new source permitting, and many 
major new sources and modifications evade community review. 
Thus, it is difficult to see how EJ groups could effectively monitor 
the caps without significant funding from the government or 
foundations. 
Aside from the capacity issue, the biggest stumbling block to 
capping proposals is that regulators lack the political will to 
implement caps. Caps necessarily mean that new sources may not be 
built if offsetting new pollution is infeasible, and regulators have 
shown very little willingness to deny permits. As an advocate once 
said, it is not unusual for regulators to think of pollution sources as 
their clients
77
 and accordingly believe that they do not have authority 
 
 77. Thomas Alan Linzey, Executive Dir., Cmty. Envtl. Legal Def. Fund, Lecture at the 
University of Pittsburgh School of Law, Sins of the Fathers: How Corporations Use the 
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to deny a permit, despite the existence of scholarly works and an 
EPA memorandum stating otherwise.
78
 BAAQMD in particular has 
stated that caps involve land use decisions, which the agency does not 
believe it has the authority to make.
79
 Indeed, because of this lack of 
will, no permit has been denied on cumulative impacts grounds, in 
spite of overwhelming evidence that EJ communities suffer from 
cumulative pollution.
80
  
Unquestionably, what is delaying reform is not a lack of good 
ideas—there are plenty of those. What we need is for our 
representatives to summon the courage and political will to do the 
right thing and protect vulnerable Americans, not just the ones who 
give the most money to political campaigns.
81
 Given that the lack of 
will is a political reality, it is incumbent on communities to mobilize 
in favor of protective state, regional, and local environmental and 
land use laws and regulations.  
Environmental leaders such as Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. and Green 
Party advocate Thomas Alan Linzey assert that we need a movement 
 
Constitution and Environmental Law to Plunder Communities and Nature (Mar. 4, 2004). 
 78. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus & Stephanie Tai, Integrating Environmental Justice into 
EPA Permitting Authority, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 617 (1999); Memorandum from Gary Guzy, Gen. 
Counsel, to certain EPA Assistant Adm‘rs, EPA Statutory and Regulatory Authorities Under 
Which Environmental Justice Issues May Be Addressed in Permitting (Dec. 1, 2000) (available 
at http://www.epa.gov/R5water/uic/uic_ej.htm). Perhaps the Attorney General‘s offices at the 
federal and state level should confirm the authority these regulators already possess to take 
cumulative impacts account in permitting.  
 79. Conversations with Amy Cohen, Program Director, BAEHC (May 20, 2009). 
 80. In the nine years that I have been with the Environmental Law and Justice Clinic, I 
know of no permits that the regional air district has denied. Although permit denials are rare, 
they do occur. In 2007, EPA denied Romic Environmental Technologies Corporation a permit 
required under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act for hazardous waste facilities, 
following a resolution passed by the landowner, Gila River Indian Community Council, not to 
sign Romic‘s permit application. Because the landowner‘s signature and certification were 
missing from the permit application, the EPA denied the permit. See William H. Carlie, EPA 
Denies Hazardous Waste Permit, Orders Firm to Investigate TCE Releases, 39 BNA ENV‘T 
REP. 79 (2008). In 2008, Roderick L. Bremby, Secretary of the Kansas Department of Health 
and Environment, became the first air quality regulator to deny a permit to a coal-fired power 
plant solely because of health risks associated with carbon dioxide emissions. In response to 
this denial, the power plant sued the regulator. State politicians then got involved to allow the 
power plant to build. See Tim Carpenter, Sunflower Condemns Lawsuit Attempts to Halt Coal 
Expansion, TOPEKA CAP. J. Aug. 4, 2009, available at http://cjonline.com/news/state_ 
government/2009-08-03/sunflower_condemns_lawsuit. 
 81. Rechtschaffen, Strategies, supra note 12, at 321.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
152 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 31:121 
 
 
to reclaim America from corporate power.
82
 BAEHC‘s work on 
cumulative pollution indeed has required a movement on a regional 
level. First, activists frustrated with the lack of regulation and 
enforcement decided that they needed to work on the regional air 
district; second, they created a broad new coalition of several existing 
coalitions and grassroots groups; and third, they met with each other 
and with the regional air district to make demands. They made public 
statements of their purpose, and they earned respect by demonstrating 
their persistence, expertise, and commitment.
83
 Importantly, in order 
to be successful in its efforts, the group secured sufficient startup 
funding, which was first provided by the San Francisco Foundation. 
As a result of the persistent work of BAEHC, the Bay Area Air 
Quality Management District is beginning to take notice of the group 
and is laying the groundwork to tackle the serious challenge of 
cumulative risk. 
C. Specific Recommendations to Nuisance Pollution in EJ 
Communities 
Traditional common law means of addressing nuisances like odor 
and dust are insufficient for EJ clients like ours. Our clinic‘s clients 
are generally uninterested in the traditional tort remedy of monetary 
compensation; rather, the clients want nuisances to be abated. But 
abatement is extremely difficult to obtain under common law. It is 
thus important to consider strategies for preventing the odor nuisance 
in the first place, rather than addressing the nuisance after the fact.
84
 
In considering approaches to preventing emissions of odorous 
substances from industries, regulators should seriously consider 
federal regulation as a strategy. The substances that are responsible 
for odor often result from emissions of hazardous air pollutants as 
Professor Morag-Levine has described.
85
 The Clean Air Act already 
 
 82. ROBERT F. KENNEDY, JR., CRIMES AGAINST NATURE (2004); Linzey, supra note 77. 
 83. Late sociology professor Charles Tilly characterized social movements in exactly this 
way. See CHARLES TILLY, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, 1768–2004 (2004).  
 84. MORAG-LEVINE, supra note 39, at 128–42.  
 85.  The South Coast Air Quality Management District, in announcing its effort to 
improve odor identification, stated that: 
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has a mechanism for regulating hazardous air pollutants, and their 
emissions can be reduced through application of control technology 
and practices. 
The first step of identifying nuisance sources should not be 
difficult since most nuisance sources are readily known to regulators, 
as SCAQMD‘s experience demonstrates.86 Nuisance sources are 
generally known to be steel foundries; waste transfer and recycling 
stations; wastewater treatment plants; landfills; composting 
operations; petroleum operations; food and byproduct processes, such 
as rendering facilities and yeast manufacturing facilities; and 
agricultural activities, such as livestock operations.
87
 
Federal regulations should be considered seriously also because 
they can be enforced by citizens through the citizen suit provision, 
unlike local or state laws, which may not provide citizens with a right 
of private enforcement. 
While some existing regulations take odor into account in setting 
compliance standards,
88
 more can be done. The EPA, for example, 
can identify nuisance sources, begin a process to understand the air 
 
The [district] receives thousands of complaints about odor from the public each year. 
Odors are the single largest source of complaints reported by residents of the South 
Coast Air Basin and comprise almost half of the total air quality complaints received 
annually. Of these, the vast majority (approximately 85%) are linked to an identifiable 
source. 
South Coast Air Quality Management District, AQMD Staff to Enhance Odor Identification, 
May 1, 2009, http://www.aqmd.gov/news1/2009/odoridentification.html. 
 86.  See, e.g., South Coast Air Quality Management District, supra note 85. 
 87.  Morag-Levine, supra note 39, at 128–42. 
 88. See Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources: Kraft Pulp Mills, 43 Fed. 
Reg. 7568, 7569 (Feb. 23, 1978); see also Approval and Promulgation of State Plans for 
Designated Facilities and Pollutants; Oklahoma; Plan for Controlling Total Reduced Sulfur 
from Existing Kraft Pulp Mills, 54 Fed. Reg. 24,903, 24,904 (June 12, 1989) (approving 
Oklahoma‘s plan for controlling TRS emissions from a kraft pulp mill under the New Source 
Performance Standards provision of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11–1 and explaining that 
―TRS emission have a distinctly unpleasant odor which may adversely affect property values 
and economic development in the vicinity of kraft pulp mills‖). The EPA later characterized its 
1978 regulation as a ―welfare related‖ control, rather than a health-based control. 54 Fed. Reg. 
at 24,904. The EPA, however, makes a distinction between regulation of odor under the New 
Source Performance Standards and the State Implementation Plan. See Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania; Approval of Revision to the Pennsylvania State Implementation Plan, 51 Fed. 
Reg. 18,438 (May 20, 1986) (withdrawing former approval of a state and local odor control 
regulation, which had been part of a State Implementation Plan, because it bore ―no significant 
relation to attainment and maintenance of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards‖). 
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pollution components of the nuisance problem, and fund research to 
address it. The process could even follow the recommendation of the 
National Environmental Justice Advisory Council that the EPA 
―convene, support, and promote a series of workshops, focus groups, 
stakeholder meetings, scientific symposia, conferences, and other 
dialogue to promote greater understanding and consensus around‖ the 
problem.
89
 
In addition to regulations that limit hazardous air pollutants, State 
Implementation Plan (―SIP‖) rules can be considered for addressing 
odor because volatile organic compounds, which are ozone 
precursors and therefore regulated through the SIP,
90
 are also 
responsible for odors. Nationwide regulation, rather than the SIP 
mechanism, however, is superior because the EPA can coordinate the 
effort.  
Interestingly, even though it is easy to identify categories of 
odorous facilities, and it is well known that stench from such 
facilities severely interferes with quality of life, regulators appear 
unwilling to set technology standards to abate the nuisance without 
first documenting that there is a certain level of community 
complaints. As Professor Morag-Levine has argued, this wait-and-see 
approach to addressing odor is steeped in the common law regime 
and is inconsistent with the purpose and intent of the Clean Air Act.
91
 
Even the most forward-looking air district, SCAQMD, is at most 
willing to refine the methods to detect odor so that prosecution can be 
improved, which may eventually result in an abatement order. All of 
these steps take time. It would be far better for communities living 
near nuisance facilities if the air district skipped the community odor 
detection stage and set the technology standards first. As anyone who 
 
 89. NAT‘L ENVTL. JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL, ENSURING RISK REDUCTION IN 
COMMUNITIES WITH MULTIPLE STRESSORS: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND CUMULATIVE 
RISKS/IMPACTS, at vii (2004). 
 90. Emissions of volatile organic compounds (―VOCs‖) are regulated under the Clean Air 
Act because VOCs (found in chemicals, such as solvents, gasoline, and other petroleum 
products) react in the presence of sunlight with NOx to form ground-level ozone, and ozone is a 
criteria pollutant. 69 Fed. Reg. 23858, at 23859 (Apr. 30, 2004) ARNOLD W. REITZE, JR., AIR 
POLLUTION CONTROL LAW: COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 73, at 33.  
 91. MORAG-LEVINE, supra note 39, at xi. 
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has lived near such a facility knows, these facilities emit odor even if 
the inspectors cannot be around to detect the stench.
92
  
Despite the limited and perhaps backward nature of SCAQMD‘s 
effort to deal with environmental nuisances, it is still noteworthy as 
the first step that any air district has taken in considering the 
environmental justice aspect of the nuisance problem. SCAQMD 
recently announced a pilot program that could improve prosecution 
efforts under the agency‘s existing nuisance regulation.93 The agency 
is recognizing that its current nuisance regulation insufficiently 
addresses the impacts on communities from odorous sources.
94
 The 
chair of the air district‘s governing board recognizes, for example, 
that ―[f]oul odors can severely impact a person‘s quality of life or 
even their health.‖95 According to the district, an odor science expert 
who has developed an odor identification device will ―review the 
agency‘s complaint database, which includes the number and type of 
complaints reported, the types of facilities suspected or confirmed as 
sources of the odor and other relevant information.‖ 96 The expert will 
then recommend steps for enhancing odor detection for the purpose 
of issuing notices of violation to facilities.  
In short, although SCAQMD‘s approach is not ideal, it is a step in 
the right direction. A better approach would be a national effort at 
identifying nuisance sources and beginning the lengthy process of 
regulating them. 
CONCLUSION 
The pursuit of environmental justice has not moved much beyond 
the rhetorical sphere, although the consistent efforts of communities 
 
 92. For an account of the difficulties in making formal complaints and having them 
accurately recorded, see Janice Schroeder, Comments at a Community Meeting Organized by 
the West Berkeley Alliance for Clean Air and Safe Jobs (Feb. 7, 2007) (statement on file with 
author). 
 93. South Coast Air Quality Management District, supra note 85. 
 94. The text of the agency‘s nuisance rule, which was adopted in 1976, is available on its 
website, South Coast Air Quality Management District, Rule 402, http://www.aqmd.gov/rules/ 
reg/reg04/r402.pdf 
 95. South Coast Air Quality Management District, supra note 85 (quoting William A. 
Burke). 
 96. Id. 
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have resulted in some hopeful signs from government leadership. The 
fact remains, however, that thirty years after environmental justice 
became a rallying cry, we still cannot point to a single regulation that 
takes into account cumulative air pollution at a neighborhood level. 
To take cumulative risk seriously, governments at all levels must 
commit to addressing the problem with actual regulation. As a 
society, we must ask ourselves how we can live in a world where 
poor and historically oppressed people bear the brunt of our luxuries. 
It is incumbent on us as citizens to build an effective movement that 
encourages our government to better protect its people. 
 
 
